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and Walsh, 2003; Muller and Kra¨ussl, 2011). The impact of natural disasters on corporate business has dra-
matically strengthened in recent years due to a number of high-proﬁle events, such as the South Asian tsunami
in 2004, Hurricane Katrina and the Kashmiri earthquake in 2005, the Californian wildﬁres of 2007 (Muller
and Kra¨ussl, 2011) and China’s Wenchuan earthquake in 2008. Thus far, however, organizational research
has not explored why and when a ﬁrm might execute a corporate philanthropic disaster response (CPDR),
which has attracted a great deal of attention given its great importance to society.
Previous research has shown that women are generally more responsive to crisis situations and more likely to
engage in giving than men (Williams, 2003). There is some anecdotal evidence that the number of women serv-
ing on a corporate board exerts an inﬂuence on the level of activities related to corporate social responsibility
(CSR) (Wang and Coﬀey, 1992; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998). It has also been observed that women are more
likely than men to desire updates on how their charitable donations are being used because they view charity as
a means of securing additional relationships and a greater involvement in the community (Marx, 2000).
Does the presence of women on boards of directors (WoBs) facilitate corporate philanthropic disaster
response, generally referred to as corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Understanding the eﬀects of increas-
ing the voice of women is even more important given the recent and upcoming changes in workforce demo-
graphics (Richard et al., 2006). In fact, Ely and Padavic (2007) note that the issue of how WoB operate in most
organizations is still a “black box”.
While Hillman and Cannella (2007) propose that increasing the number of WoB would alter inter-group
relations among directors and aﬀect organizational strategy, the empirical literature on the relationship
between WoB and CSR has produced few studies that systematically theorize and test women’s inﬂuence at
the corporate level (Terjesen et al., 2009). Williams (2003) studies this relationship based on the corporate
charitable giving stated in annual reports and conﬁrms that the underlying motives for why women are more
charitable than men remain unclear. Furthermore, no previous studies have employed constructs and variables
that are speciﬁcally germane to a CPDR evaluation perspective (Muller and Kra¨ussl, 2011), especially in a
transitional economy such as China where corporate social practices are too underdeveloped to establish a
well-formed CSR culture.
Our empirical test oﬀers a thorough examination of the ﬁrm-level eﬀects of WoB, beginning with the gen-
eral question that opened this article and moving to address whether and how WoB inﬂuence corporate phil-
anthropic strategy and the disbursal of corporate resources through participation in and contribution to
corporate disaster response. In particular, we investigate how female directors evaluate CPDR and highlight
a diﬀerent aspect of the relationship between WoB and CSR. Speciﬁcally, we emphasize that the role of female
directors is to evaluate rather than facilitate CPDR.
Our ﬁrst goal is to explore the eﬀect of WoB on CPDR by integrating agency costs theory and a knowledge-
based view to suggest a negative relationship between WoB and CPDR. Theoretically, the most relevant the-
ories for explaining women’s eﬀects on corporate issues in China are agency costs and knowledge-based the-
ory. Agency costs theory captures the essence of CPDR in China and asks for regulatory methods to increase
governance eﬃciency and restrain agency costs. The knowledge-based view of ﬁrms suggests that increased
communication, coordination and collaboration among organizational members are the keys to eﬃcient orga-
nizational decisions because they allow for knowledge integration through the pooling of group resources
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Pelled et al., 1999). These theories complement our investigation of the relationship
between WoB and CPDR in China.
Our second goal is to explore the managerial motivation for CPDR. Previous studies have not considered
what motivates female directors in CPDR situations, i.e. whether they restrain agency costs for the beneﬁt of
investors or whether they serve their own self interest by targeting private managerial beneﬁts. Godfrey et al.
(2008) ﬁnd that the insurance eﬀect of CSR that protects investors’ wealth holds for the CSR targeting of a
ﬁrm’s secondary stakeholders, but does not hold for the social initiatives targeting of a ﬁrm’s primary stake-
holders. We still do not know the CPDR target that motivates directors and whether it has potential beneﬁts
for investors.
Furthermore, it is important to understand the conditions under which female directors exert the ability to
evaluate the beneﬁts and restrain the agency costs of CPDR. Although strategic scholars have identiﬁed the
external environment as the key contingency factor in the relationship between organizational processes and
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play in the relationship between WoB and CPDR. We call for an integration of the organizational behavior
and strategy literature and posit that women’s behavior and group processes in speciﬁc environmental contexts
must be considered, along with the association between these processes and the context in which they occur.
Therefore, it is important to consider the varying impact that WoB have on CPDR under diﬀerent types of con-
ditions. Thus, our third goal is to examine contingent eﬀects on the relationship between WoB and CPDRs.
This study makes the following contributions. First, we extend the literature by integrating agency costs and
knowledge-based theories and propose an evaluation function for female directors to emphasize the negative
impact that WoB have on CPDR. Second, we examine the moderating eﬀects of marketization and political
connections – typical characteristics of transitional economies, especially China – on the relationship between
WoB and CPDR. Third, we use a unique database gathered from Chinese privately-owned listed ﬁrms’ dona-
tion announcements after the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008, and the empirical results support our hypotheses.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The next section describes the theoretical model and pre-
sents hypotheses for empirical testing. The third section outlines the empirical method used to investigate the
hypotheses. The fourth section presents the results. The ﬁfth and concluding section discusses the implications
of the ﬁndings and the limitations of the study.
2. Theory and hypothesis development
In this section we discuss why CPDR contains considerable agency costs, especially in China. We then con-
sider how WoB aﬀect the organizational evaluation of CPDR before philanthropic contribution decisions are
made. In addition, we outline two contingency factors that might mitigate female directors’ ability to properly
evaluate CPDR: the marketization factor, which inﬂuences whether female directors are empowered with the
rights to evaluate CPDR and the political connection factor, which determines the extent to which female direc-
tors hold the rights to alter CPDR.
2.1. Corporate philanthropic disaster response and agency costs
Margolis and Walsh (2001) review almost 100 studies attempting to quantify a relationship between CSR
and corporate ﬁnancial performance, but they fail to produce a conclusive result. The motivation behind CSR
is quite complex and changes within diﬀerent contexts, making it diﬃcult to rely on a single theory to explain
all of the resulting relationships. We propose that CPDR can be classiﬁed as a kind of agency cost in China
that is based on exchanges between ﬁrms and the government.
2.1.1. Exchanges between ﬁrms and government in China
“CSR activities targeting primary stakeholders should produce exchange capital among groups – the poten-
tial to create more advantageous exchanges between the ﬁrm and its primary stakeholders. Such CSR activ-
ities, however, are less likely to produce moral capital; indeed, precisely because these actions can be viewed
through a power-exchange lens they may be viewed as merely self-serving, rather than other-regarding, behav-
iors” (Godfrey et al., 2008, p. 5).
As one of the largest transitional economies in the world, China has undergone dramatic changes
since 1978. The government has played a very important role in economic development and continues to
exert great inﬂuence on corporate operations (Nee et al., 2007; He and Tian, 2008). Government bureaus
at all levels are powerful groups in that they are the most important stakeholders of business ﬁrms (He
and Tian, 2008).
Even with China’s current economic transition, a large number of ﬁrms still depend on the government for
resources such as capital, land, favorable policies and other assistance. A Chinese ﬁrm must use some govern-
ment-oriented strategies to cultivate its relationship with the government. Chinese political institutions do not
legitimize corporate political rent-seeking such as campaign contributions or corporate lobbying, so it
becomes necessary to ﬁnd other ways to obtain rents. In China, ﬁrms use philanthropic contributions for
rent-seeking more frequently than ﬁrms in other countries. Corporate involvement in government-proposed
social and charitable activities is a very helpful conduit because ﬁrms achieve moral legitimacy when the
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in 2008, the government encouraged ﬁrms to engage in disaster relief. Because corporate donations were moti-
vated in this way, CPDR helped ﬁrms to cultivate a beneﬁcial relationship with the government, which in turn
created favorable policies. This kind of donation is similar to the political lobbying that prompts cash-pref-
erential policy exchanges between ﬁrms and the government.
2.1.2. Agency cost perspective
It remains a concern that corporate responses to disaster in the form of cash donations to the government are
not altruistic. In such cases state-owned listed ﬁrms should donate more generously than privately-owned listed
ﬁrms because the former represent the government’s eﬀorts to assume social responsibility and deliver disaster
relief. However, Zhang et al. (2009) ﬁnd that state-owned listed ﬁrms donated less than privately-owned listed
ﬁrms in response to the Wenchuan earthquake. Furthermore, disaster victims typically need vital emergency
materials such as food, water and medicine, and it can be diﬃcult to apply cash in solving such resource limi-
tation problems in a timely manner. A ﬁrm’s choice to donate cash is mainly driven by the knowledge that doing
so might grab stakeholders’ attention without the responsibilities of providing the necessities of disaster relief.
Consistent with a political contribution perspective on CPDR, managerial opportunism is an additional
motive behind corporate disaster donations. A manager may contribute corporate resources to achieve a
higher social status, gain favor with board members by contributing to their favorite causes or further their
own ideological preferences (Barnard, 1997). Boatsman and Gupta (1996) and Helland and Smith (2003) pro-
vide evidence that managers and board members exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence over corporate giving. Previous
studies on the antecedents of CSR show that agency cost-related variables such as managerial shareholdings,
board composition and the number of board members signiﬁcantly inﬂuence corporate donations (e.g., Brown
et al., 2006; Helland and Smith, 2003). Giving programs may enable managers and directors to support favor-
ite charities at shareholders’ expense.
Although managers may use CPDR to build up a relationship (guanxi) with the government and simulta-
neously purchase personal beneﬁts, many empirical studies show that the practice is not necessarily beneﬁcial
for investors.
2.1.3. Empirical studies on CPDR
Several empirical studies support our conclusion that CPDR is not related to altruism. Muller and Whit-
eman (2008) collect data on donations related to the South Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina and the Kash-
miri earthquake from Fortune Global 500 ﬁrms located in North America, Europe and Asia. Their results
reveal inter-regional diﬀerences in the overall likelihood of donations and their cash value, providing evidence
of a home-region eﬀect on CPDR, whereby ﬁrms pay more attention to disasters that are close to home or in
locations where they have a local presence. Shan et al. (2008) study the economic motivation for corporate
donations based on Chinese ﬁrms’ responses to the Wenchuan earthquake and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with products
directly related to consumers’ daily lives generally donated 50% more than other ﬁrms.
It could be argued that if CPDR is certain to be beneﬁcial to a ﬁrm, its investors would respond positively
to corporate donation announcements. However, empirical results from previous studies do not support this
conclusion. Muller and Kra¨ussl (2011) investigate stock market reactions to corporate donation announce-
ments based on the corporate response to Hurricane Katrina. Their results show that CPDR is not linked
to speciﬁcally positive or negative abnormal returns overall. They further argue that in such cases the donating
ﬁrm gains no “moral capital” because although the cause (the CPDR) is considered positive, the ﬁrm’s inten-
tions are not perceived as genuine.
Taken together, both the exchanges between ﬁrms and government and the agency cost perspective
suggest that CPDR which targets the Chinese government generates private beneﬁts for managers, and that this
kind of corporate donation is similar to an agency cost that does not deﬁnitively provide beneﬁts for investors.
2.2. Women on boards of directors and corporate philanthropic disaster response
CPDR contains agency costs and is not necessarily consistent with investors’ values. Although directors can
expropriate private beneﬁts from CPDR, female directors have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent motivations from their
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corporate eﬃciency and the consideration of investors. International comparisons show that countries with
more women in their governments also have a lower level of corruption (Swamy et al., 2001; Dollar et al.,
2001; Cheung and Herna´ndez-Julia´n, 2007). Eckel and Grossman (2001) ﬁnd women to be less selﬁsh in dic-
tator game experiments and Schubert et al. (1999) ﬁnd them to be more risk-averse in their ﬁnancial decision-
making. Levi et al. (2008) show that the bid premium over pre-announcement target share prices is statistically
and economically smaller if the CEO of the bidding ﬁrm is a woman. These studies suggest that women would
be less likely to participate in the selﬁsh, risky activities of corruption and more likely to use creative measures
to discover value and correct the tendency to overpay, if it exists.
The eﬀect of female directors in boardrooms on buﬀering the conﬂicts of interest that arise between male
directors and investors during CPDR, from an agency costs and knowledge-based perspective, suggests a neg-
ative relationship between WoB and CPDR. The knowledge-based view of the ﬁrm suggests that although
knowledge is developed by individuals, the organization plays a critical role in articulating and applying it
through integration and coordination eﬀorts (Grant, 1996). WoB have a positive eﬀect on corporate gover-
nance eﬃciency (Francoeur et al., 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). On male-dominated corporate boards,
female directors promote a better understanding of the marketplace, increase organizational creativity and
innovation, exercise eﬀective problem solving, promote corporate monitoring, decrease the private beneﬁts
of managerial control, enhance the eﬀectiveness of corporate leadership, display a better understanding of
the complexities of the environment, promote more eﬀective global relationships and encourage cultural sen-
sitivity among corporate leaders (Robinson and Dechant, 1997; Carter et al., 2003; Richard et al., 2007).
The potential agency costs of CPDR stimulate female directors to make decisions in opposition to those of their
male counterparts, preventing the chance that CPDR will be initiated by selﬁsh behavior.
Based on the preceding logic, because CPDR contains considerable agency costs it is reasonable to propose
that WoB increase corporate governance eﬃciency and female directors evaluate the beneﬁts of CPDR for
shareholders, restrain the agency costs of CPDR and, consequently, respond negatively to CPDR. Hence,
we assert:
Hypothesis 1. Women on boards of directors have a negative association with corporate philanthropic
contributions to disaster relief.2.3. Moderating roles of political connections and marketization
Contingency theory states that an organizational process must ﬁt its context (Drazin and Van de Ven,
1985). It hypothesizes that no one method of management can be optimally eﬀective in all situations, and
research should explore the context in which various resources will have the best inﬂuence (Miller and Sham-
sie, 1996; Richard et al., 2007).
Given that it is the largest transitional economy in the world, China has only recently built up an eﬃcient
institutional separation between business and government. Firms, governments and wide societal elements col-
lectively shape market regulations conducted through consultation and accommodation, resulting in incre-
mental and ongoing rather than episodic and radical policy change (Detomasi, 2008). Therefore,
relationships with the government help ﬁrms to obtain rent-seeking beneﬁts. Detomasi (2008) argues that
the institutional characteristics of a political environment have the potential to determine whether and how
ﬁrms might pursue CSR. We propose that political connections with the government and marketization levels
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the relationship between WoB and CPDR in China.2.3.1. The moderating role of political connections
Political connections are a kind of relational wealth whereby managers’ personal connections with the gov-
ernment (or government oﬃcials) aﬀect not only corporate performance but also decisions regarding issues
such as philanthropic contributions. A number of studies examine corporate political connections within dif-
ferent countries (see, e.g., Fisman (2001) for Indonesia, Johnson and Mitton (2003) for Malaysia, Ferguson
and Voth (2008) for Germany and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) for a sample of outside directors in the
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value (Faccio, 2007). Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that politically connected ﬁrms should beneﬁt
from their connections, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption. If CPDR facilitates the
development and maintenance of relationships with the government, then political connections should pro-
mote the eﬀects of corporate philanthropic decisions beyond any constraints, such as female directors’ nega-
tive impact on CPDR – ultimately facilitating ﬁrm-government exchanges.
In politically connected ﬁrms, female directors encounter strong pressure exerted by politically connected
managers and a ﬁrm-connected government,whichmightmake them less likely to vote againstCPDR.This creates
an environment in which female directors are less likely to challenge a political intervention initiated by the gov-
ernment that interrupts the regular organizational decision-making process. Based on this logic, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. Political connections weaken the eﬀect of female directors in such a way that the negative
relationship between women on boards of directors and corporate philanthropic contributions to disasters will
be less salient for listed ﬁrms with political connections.2.3.2. The moderating role of marketization
Market development means market-based transactions and a free economy. In an environment with a high
level of marketization, capital markets tend to be broad, deep and active, providing venture capital for start-ups
and disciplining poor performing ﬁrms to produce returns and increase their value for shareholders (Murtha
and Lenway, 1994). The process of organizational decision making in this type of environment is normative
and follows market principles. Professional women are selected and promoted to various boards based onmerit.
Female directors are less likely to encounter a glass ceiling when they seek promotion and are empowered based
on their board seats. This empowerment strengthens their ability to oppose their male counterparts regarding
CPDR, which contains considerable agency costs. In addition, an eﬃcient market that yields insigniﬁcant posi-
tive returns after CPDR (Muller and Kra¨ussl, 2011) validates the rejection of CPDR by female directors.
However, if ﬁrms are operating under an environment with a low level of marketization that does not allow
for promoting women onto boards of directors, they will not have the motivation to invite professional women
capable of hampering the male-dominant board culture to serve on their boards. Furthermore, female directors
will be more likely to be punished for their contrary suggestions/decisions than their male counterparts.
Westphal and Stern (2007) use survey data from 760 outside directors at large and medium-sized US ﬁrms
and ﬁnd that women are rewarded less than their male counterparts in the director labor market for engaging
in a given level of advice-giving or ingratiatory behavior. In other words, women are less likely to improve their
chances of receiving a board appointment by engaging in this behavior. They are also punished more frequently
for engaging in monitoring and controlling behavior. In these situations, female directors are compelled to
agree with their male counterparts rather than vote against them. Following this logic, we posit:
Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship between women on boards of directors and corporate philanthropic
contributions to disasters will be more salient for listed ﬁrms operating in an environment with a higher level
of marketization than those operating in an environment with a lower level of marketization.3. Methodology
3.1. Sample
The May 12, 2008 Wenchuan earthquake resulted in more than 68,858 deaths and losses in the hundreds of
billions of Yuan as of May 30, 2008. These numbers will undoubtedly continue to increase as more informa-
tion becomes available about the extent of the event (Wang, 2008). After the earthquake, many publicly traded
ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges disclosed philanthropic contribution plans. Our
sample consists of all privately-owned ﬁrms listed before 2006, a total of 519 ﬁrms.
We do not include state-owned listed ﬁrms in our study for the following reasons. First, the legitimacy of
state-owned listed ﬁrms’ donations of corporate resources to the government is still debatable. The regulatory
agencies with jurisdiction over SOEs have raised concerns that such donations could undermine the value of
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of SOEs is complex. Wang and Qian (2010) study the relationship between corporate donation and perfor-
mance in China and ﬁnd that state-owned ﬁrms do not receive beneﬁts from corporate donations. An SOE’s
donation of corporate resources is more likely to be motivated by other political factors, regardless of the eco-
nomic returns. Third, there are generally fewer women serving on the corporate boards of state-owned listed
ﬁrms than on the boards of privately-owned listed ﬁrms. Based on our collected data, the ratio of WoB is only
9% in SOEs, comparatively less than the ratio of WoB in privately-owned ﬁrms. However, studies on women’s
ability to alter corporate decision making emphasizes that only one or two women usually serve in the board-
room, and they are treated as tokens whose contributions are dismissed or devalued by their male counterparts
(e.g., Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). Consequently, the eﬀect of women on corporate governance is
quite limited in SOEs. Furthermore, in a robustness test, we analyze a sample of SOEs and ﬁnd the relation-
ship between the ratio of WoB and corporate donations is not signiﬁcant.
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Muller and Whiteman, 2008) our investigation is based on ﬁrm self-
reporting and draws from information disseminated through the oﬃcial information disclosure website
appointed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),2 corporate websites and press releases.3
To obtain charitable donation data, we match these ﬁrms with data provided in corporate disclosures after the
earthquake. The disclosures include information on cash contributions by ﬁrms. A total of 121 listed ﬁrms
made charitable donations. We also use ﬁnancial data from these ﬁrms’ annual reports for 2006. As a result
of missing data, the sample varies between 468 and 476 listed ﬁrms.
3.2. Measures and analytical approach
3.2.1. Dependent measures
In line with Brown et al. (2006), we introduce three dependent variables: donation, the ratio of giving to
assets and the ratio of giving to proﬁts. We use the dummy variable donation to measure whether a ﬁrm dem-
onstrated a philanthropic disaster response. If the ﬁrm responded to the disaster, donation is coded 1, other-
wise 0. The ratio of giving is deﬁned as the amount the ﬁrm identiﬁed as its cash contribution to disaster relief.
We use two ratios of giving measures proposed by Brown et al. (2006), where the ratio of giving to assets equals
the log-transformed (ratio of RMB value of company donations to total assets  100 + 1) and ratio of giving to
proﬁt equals the log-transformed (ratio of RMB value of company donations to net proﬁts + 1).
3.2.2. Independent variable
We use the ratio of women on boards of directors as the measure of WoB. This treatment is consistent with
previous studies (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Campell and Mı´nguez-Vera, 2007).
3.2.3. Moderating variables
Next, we include three moderating variables. Following Faccio (2007) and Fan and Wong (2007) we deﬁne
political connection as the CEO being connected to current or former government bureaucrats or a member of
the Peoples’ Congress. We measure the marketization of diﬀerent regions that listed ﬁrms are registered in
China based on Fan and Wang (2010). We decompose the index of marketization into marketization level
and law enforcement level as proposed by Fan and Wang (2010). Based on whether the marketization and
law enforcement level values are larger than the mean, we construct two dummy variables and code market-
ization and law enforcement levels as 1 and 0, respectively.
3.2.4. Control
A number of controls are included in the analysis. The ratio of debt to assets is measured to control for
capital structure. Net proﬁt is speciﬁed in the model as a control variable because it has been found to have1 In November 2009, the Chinese State-owned Assets Supervision Admission Committee established a regulation on charitable giving by
SOEs that are under central government control. Please refer to the website: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-12/16/content_1488862.htm.
2 The website is http://www.cninfo.com.cn/default.htm.
3 The information published on http://www.ﬁnance.sina.com.cn/blank/zzqyxd.shtml also provides corporate giving data.
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power (Brown et al., 2006). In addition, we introduce listed years, the number of years between the year in
which the ﬁrm was listed in 2008, to control for the eﬀect of corporate familiarity because ﬁrms that have been
listed for a long time tend to make large philanthropic contributions (Godfrey, 2005). We also control for the
geographic location eﬀect with geographic distance, which is calculated based on the geographic distance
between the registered region of the listed ﬁrm and the earthquake center as drawn from Google Maps data.
Finally, we introduce market type to control for industry eﬀects. If a ﬁrm’s industry is classiﬁed as not being
related to the basic necessities of life such as clothing, food, shelter and transportation, the market type is
coded 1, otherwise 0.
3.3. Correction for endogeneity
Although we anticipate that WoB inﬂuence corporate donations to disasters, it is possible that corporate
characteristics inﬂuence the presence of women on corporate boards. Brown et al. (2006) propose that ﬁrms
introduce women onto their boards symbolically. If suﬃcient women serve on the board of supervisors, which
is coordinated with the board of directors, the ﬁrm will also provide more seats on the board for women, to
disperse any concerns about discrimination. Furthermore, if the chairman, CEO or board secretary is a
woman, then the ﬁrm will have more women on the board of directors in accordance with a preference for
gender similarity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that the ratio of WoB is smal-
ler in large ﬁrms. Keeping the requirement of eﬃcient instrumental variables in mind, to control for potential
endogeneity we introduce number of female directors on monitoring board, chairman or CEO is a woman, board
secretary is a woman and corporate asset scale as instrumental variables.Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions. This table reports and describes the variables used in our regression analysis. Data sources: A = annual reports;
B = listed ﬁrms temporary disclosure; C = data stream (http://www.gtarsc.com/) and D = news reports on the Internet or in books.
Variables Description Source
Donation If the listed ﬁrm donates, this variable is coded 1, otherwise 0 B, D
Cash giving (RMB) The amount of cash given by listed ﬁrms B, D
Ratio of giving to assets Logarithm of (ratio of cash giving to total assets  100 + 1) C
Ratio of giving to proﬁts Logarithm of (ratio of cash giving to net proﬁt + 1) C
Ratio of WoB The proportion of women on boards of directors A
Number of female directors on the
board of supervisors
Equals the number of female directors on corporate supervisory boards A, C
Chairman or CEO is a woman If the gender of the Chairman or CEO is female, this variable is coded 1, otherwise 0 A, C
Board secretary is a woman If the gender of the board secretary is female, this variable is coded 1, otherwise 0 A, C
Total assets Corporate assets including all debt and equity A, C
Marketization level Based on the data provided by Fan and Wang (2010), which is supported by the
National Economic Research Institute (NERI). When the value of marketization is
larger than the mean, this variable is coded 1, otherwise 0
D
Law enforcement level Based on the data provided by Fan and Wang (2010), according to whether the value
of law enforcement is larger or smaller than the mean, it is coded 1 or 0, respectively
D
Political connection Political aﬃliation is deﬁned as the CEO being a current or former government
bureaucrat or a member of the Peoples’ Congress
A
Ratio debt to assets Ratio of total debt to total assets A
Net proﬁt Proﬁts excluding costs A
Cash holding Calculated based on the formula: (cash and cash equivalents + temporary
investments)/(total Assets  cash and cash equivalents  temporary investments)
A
Earn per share The ratio of net proﬁt to total shares C
Listed years Number of years between the listing year and 2008 A
Geographic distance Geographic distance is calculated based on the geographic distance between the
registered region of listed ﬁrms and the earthquake center
D
Market type According to the industry categories of listed ﬁrms, if the industry is not related to
basic necessities of life such as clothing, food, shelter and transportation, the market
type is coded 1, otherwise zero
A
Table 2
Means, standard deviations and correlations.a
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. Donation 0.27 0.44
2. Ratio of giving to
assetsb,c
3.00 5.11 0.99
3. Ratio of giving to
proﬁtsb,d
2.92 5.02 0.99 0.99
4. Ratio of WoB 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08
5. Number of female
directors on the
board of supervisors
0.94 0.92 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.15
6. Chairman or CEO is
a woman
0.12 0.32 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.29 0.06
7. Board secretary is a
woman
0.21 0.4 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.02
8. Total assetsb 20.98 1.13 0.29 0.25 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.05
9. Marketization level 0.59 0.49 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.02 0 0.13
10. Law enforcement
level
0.53 0.5 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.88
11. Political connection 0.3 0.46 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.02
12. Ratio of debt to
assetsb
3.94 0.65 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.08
13. Net proﬁtb 19.6 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.07 0.03 0.02 0 0.47 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.01
14. Cash holding 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.21 0.08 0.33 0.06
15. Earn per shareb 1.44 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.32 0.19
16. Listed years 8.77 4.31 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.2 0.11 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.31 0.19
17. Geographic
distanceb
7.46 0.6 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.41 0.38 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.1
18. Market type 0.66 0.47 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.06
a N = 476; correlationsP |0.09| are signiﬁcant at the p < 0.05 level.
b Logarithm.
c N = 470 due to missing data.
d N = 468 due to missing data.
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Table 3
First-stage regression analysis for the ratio of women on boards of
directors.a
Variables Coeﬃcients
Number of female directors on the board of
supervisors
0.015***
(0.01)
Chairman or CEO is a woman 0.093***
(0.02)
Board secretary is a woman 0.038***
(0.01)
Total assetsb 0.010*
(0.01)
Ratio of debt to assetsb 0.005
(0.01)
Net proﬁtb 0.020
(0.02)
Cash holding 0.020
(0.02)
Earn per shareb 0.037
(0.05)
Listed years 0.000
(0.00)
Geographic distanceb 0.002
(0.01)
Market type 0.013
(0.01)
Political connection 0.002
(0.01)
Marketization level 0.019
(0.03)
Law enforcement level 0.021
(0.03)
Constant 0.643
(0.42)
Adjusted R2 0.14
N 476
a Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
b Logarithm.
* p < 0.1 for two-tailed tests.
*** p < 0.01 for two-tailed tests.
92 M. Jia, Z. Zhang / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 83–99The analysis is conducted in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we use ordinary regressions to model the inﬂuence
of instrumental variables on the ratio of WoB. In the second stage we include the endogeneity correction var-
iable and use a binomial logistic regression to model the likelihood that a given ﬁrm is expected to donate. We
analyze the ratios of giving amounts using Tobit regression models. Because a large number of values for the
dependent variable ‘Giving’ are 0, the censorship regression model is appropriate. Table 1 presents the deﬁ-
nitions and sources of the data.4. Results
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4a–4c. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of our variables.
The correlations between the variables do not suggest any potential for serious multicollinearity in the regres-
sion analysis.
Table 3 reports the regression results and eﬀectiveness of the instrumental variables. As predicted, all of the
instrumental variables are signiﬁcantly related to the ratio of WoB. Following the methods described in our
Table 4a
Second-stage regression results predicting the relationship between corporate donations and women on boards of directors.a
Independent variables Dependent variables
Donation Ratio of giving to assets Ratio of giving to proﬁts
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ratio of debt to assetsb 0.087 0.997 0.949
(0.17) (1.50) (1.51)
Net proﬁtb 3.534*** 14.349*** 14.264***
(0.93) (3.83) (3.82)
Cash holding 0.109 0.764 0.006
(0.53) (3.81) (3.83)
Earn per shareb 0.745 6.186 7.292
(1.53) (5.77) (5.79)
Listed years 0.126*** 0.820*** 0.827***
(0.03) (0.20) (0.20)
Geographic distanceb 0.805*** 5.360*** 5.469***
(0.20) (1.36) (1.36)
Market type 0.636** 3.972** 4.173**
(0.27) (1.77) (1.77)
Residual of ratio of WoB 7.976** 43.045* 43.434*
(3.48) (23.75) (23.70)
Political connection 1.216*** 8.777*** 8.905***
(0.25) (1.66) (1.66)
Marketization level 0.827 4.800 4.476
(0.54) (3.43) (3.41)
Law enforcement level 0.070 0.866 0.804
(0.50) (3.19) (3.18)
Ratio of WoB 7.653** 41.502* 40.537*
(3.42) (22.35) (22.32)
Constant 63.754*** 246.176*** 245.239***
(17.24) (73.43) (73.33)
Log likelihood 217.450 611.692 600.434
Chi2 103.258 114.177 115.022
N 476 470 468
a Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
b Logarithm.
* p < 0.1 for two-tailed tests.
** p < 0.05 for two-tailed tests.
*** p < 0.01 for two-tailed tests.
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female directors on the board and include it in the following regression models.
Tables 4a–4c report the regression model for CPDR. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the residual of the ratio of
WoB conﬁrm the endogeneity problem for WoB and the eﬀectiveness of introducing the two-stage regression
method to correct for it. To test whether political connections, marketization level and law enforcement level
are signiﬁcant moderators of the relationship between WoB and CPDR, we introduce a hierarchical regression
analysis. Step 1 includesmodels 1, 2 and 3. The control andmain eﬀect variables are included with the dependent
variables donation, ratio of giving to assets and ratio of giving to proﬁts, respectively. When model 1 predicts
CPDR probability, the coeﬃcient for the ratio of WoB (b = 7.653, p < 0.05) is signiﬁcant. Similarly, when
models 2 and 3 predict the giving ratio, the coeﬃcients for the ratio of WoB in model 2 (b = 41.502,
p < 0.10) and model 3 (b = 40.537, p < 0.10) are also signiﬁcant. These results support Hypothesis 1.
Step 2 includes models 4, 5 and 6. We include the product term of political connection  ratio of WoB to
signify the interaction between political connections and WoB. When model 4 predicts CPDR probability, the
interaction eﬀect between political connections and the ratio of WoB is signiﬁcant (b = 4.337, p < 0.05). When
models 5 and 6 are used to predict the ratio of giving to assets and the ratio of giving to proﬁts, the interaction
eﬀects are also signiﬁcant in model 5 (b = 26.059, p < 0.10) and model 6 (b = 24.452, p < 0.10), which support
Hypothesis 2.
Table 4b
Second-stage regression results predicting the relationship between corporate donations and women on boards of directors, including the
moderator of political connections.a
Independent variables Dependent variables
Donation Ratio of giving to assets Ratio of giving to proﬁts
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ratio of debt to assetsb 0.081 0.858 0.806
(0.17) (1.49) (1.49)
Net proﬁtb 3.709*** 14.838*** 14.688***
(0.96) (3.83) (3.82)
Cash holding 0.119 0.841 0.091
(0.54) (3.79) (3.80)
Earnings per shareb 0.647 5.753 6.816
(1.52) (5.74) (5.75)
Listed years 0.122*** 0.793*** 0.800***
(0.04) (0.20) (0.20)
Geographic distanceb 0.865*** 5.684*** 5.770***
(0.19) (1.38) (1.37)
Market type 0.601** 3.809** 4.015**
(0.27) (1.77) (1.76)
Residual of ratio of WoB 7.842** 40.019* 40.759*
(3.55) (23.77) (23.71)
Political connection 0.727** 5.802** 6.092***
(0.34) (2.27) (2.27)
Marketization level 0.870 5.146 4.804
(0.55) (3.44) (3.42)
Law enforcement level 0.095 1.027 0.962
(0.51) (3.19) (3.17)
Ratio of WoB 9.234** 49.815** 48.539**
(3.59) (22.88) (22.85)
Political connection  ratio of WoB 4.337** 26.059* 24.452*
(2.21) (14.27) (14.19)
Constant 66.549*** 252.944*** 250.866***
(17.77) (73.32) (73.18)
Log likelihood 215.610 609.999 598.930
Chi2 105.241 117.564 118.031
N 476 470 468
a Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
b Logarithm.
* p < 0.1 for two-tailed tests.
** p < 0.05 for two-tailed tests.
*** p < 0.01 for two-tailed tests.
94 M. Jia, Z. Zhang / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 83–99Step 3 includes models 7, 8 and 9. We include interaction terms between political connections, marketiza-
tion and political intervention with the ratio of WoB. The interaction terms between political connection and
the ratio of WoB are positive and signiﬁcant in models 7 and 8. However, the interaction terms between the
marketization-related variables and the ratio of WoB are not signiﬁcant in all three models. These results con-
ﬁrm Hypothesis 2, but not Hypothesis 3.
To visualize the relationship outlined in Hypothesis 2, Figs. 1a and 1b show the plot of the signiﬁcant inter-
action (Aiken and West, 1991) between political connections and the ratio of WoB. The CPDR probability
and giving ratio are negatively related to WoB, and the relationship is more salient within ﬁrms without polit-
ical connections than with political connections.5. Discussion
Previous CSR research has not studied the relationship between WoB and CPDR or considered the ways in
which institutional environments moderate it. Using unique data collected from privately-owned listed ﬁrms’
Table 4c
Second-stage regression results predicting the relationship between corporate donations and women on boards of directors, including the
three moderators.a
Independent variables Dependent variables
Donation Ratio of giving to assets Ratio of giving to proﬁts
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Ratio of debt to assetsb 0.080 0.866 0.816
(0.17) (1.48) (1.49)
Net proﬁtb 3.662*** 14.429*** 14.434***
(0.96) (3.85) (3.85)
Cash holding 0.124 0.803 0.053
(0.54) (3.78) (3.80)
Earnings per shareb 0.647 5.350 6.508
(1.55) (5.75) (5.77)
Listed years 0.121*** 0.786*** 0.794***
(0.04) (0.20) (0.20)
Geographic distanceb 0.865*** 5.703*** 5.780***
(0.19) (1.38) (1.37)
Market type 0.598** 3.766** 3.985**
(0.27) (1.76) (1.76)
Residual of ratio of WoB 7.888** 41.092* 41.620*
(3.53) (23.78) (23.75)
Political connection 0.740** 5.905*** 6.166***
(0.35) (2.27) (2.27)
Marketization level 0.972 7.429 6.512
(0.69) (4.76) (4.74)
Law enforcement level 0.096 0.000 0.009
(0.64) (4.43) (4.41)
Ratio of WoB 8.665** 43.463* 44.756*
(3.88) (24.18) (24.13)
Political connection  ratio of WoB 4.200* 24.535* 23.461
(2.26) (14.31) (14.25)
Marketization level  ratio of WoB 0.873 19.648 14.793
(5.00) (29.94) (29.59)
Law enforcement level  ratio of WoB 0.065 9.209 8.644
(4.88) (29.45) (29.10)
Constant 65.703*** 245.007*** 245.854***
(17.84) (73.65) (73.71)
Log likelihood 215.526 609.627 598.760
Chi2 107.602 118.308 118.370
N 476 470 468
a Standard errors are listed in parentheses.
b Logarithm.
* p < 0.1 for two-tailed tests.
** p < 0.05 for two-tailed tests.
*** p < 0.01 for two-tailed tests.
M. Jia, Z. Zhang /China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 83–99 95philanthropic disaster responses after China’s Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, this study provides convincing
evidence that CPDR is negatively related to the ratio of WoB, and that political connections positively mod-
erate the relationship between WoB and CPDR. However, our results do not support the theory that mark-
etization-related factors, such as marketization level and law enforcement level, also moderate this
relationship.
5.1. Theoretical implications
This study makes the following theoretical contributions. First, it extends the CSR literature to show that
women in boardrooms inﬂuence corporate social practice. Our comprehensive model also explores a distinc-
tive type of CSR, namely corporate philanthropic disaster response (CPDR). In addition, we use a previously
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Fig. 1a. The moderating eﬀect of political connections on the relationship between women on boards of directors and corporate donation
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Fig. 1b. The moderating eﬀect of political connections on the relationship between women on boards of directors and corporate giving
ratio.
96 M. Jia, Z. Zhang / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 83–99unstudied context, CPDR, and incorporate political connections along with marketization and law enforce-
ment levels as moderators. Thus, this study not only contributes to the ongoing exploration of the relationship
between WoB and CPDR, but also promotes an increased understanding of the impact that corporate ties
with government and institutional environments have on this relationship.
Second, the study advances our understanding of female directors’ function as evaluators of the agency
costs of CPDR, which challenges the notion that women are more “giving” than men in times of crisis. Pre-
vious studies on the relationship between WoB and CSR emphasize the emotional perspective that female
directors are generally more responsive to acts of giving than their male counterparts in crisis situations
(e.g., Williams, 2003). This study overturns previous views of female directors, presenting instead a profes-
sional and rational perspective that emphasizes the eﬀects of their evaluations when making corporate contri-
bution decisions after natural disasters.
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between ﬁrms and the government they include signiﬁcant agency costs and female directors play a very
important evaluation role that constrains the irrational waste of corporate resources and protects investor
value.
Third, our results provide insights into the moderating role of ﬁrm relationships with government and the
institutional environment in the relationship between WoB and CPDR. In particular, this study illustrates
how the negative eﬀect that female directors have on CPDR might be undermined in diﬀerent conditions, espe-
cially in a transitional economy like that of China. This analysis helps to paint a more complete picture of the
relationship between WoB and CPDR.
5.2. Managerial implications
Our results also have practical implications for listed ﬁrms. CSR is thought to be essential to corporate sur-
vival and growth, yet very little research has clariﬁed how a ﬁrm should initiate and utilize CSR, particularly
regarding how ﬁrms should respond to natural disasters. Based on our results, we advise that WoB help listed
ﬁrms to evaluate the beneﬁts of CPDR and restrain the wasteful donation of corporate resources. Further-
more, we also suggest that political connections inﬂuence the impact that female directors have on CPDR.
In a transitional economy like China, the chairman or CEO’s political status determines the empowerment
of female directors, and they are well empowered to vote against CPDR in ﬁrms that are not politically
connected.
5.3. Limitations and future research
This study has the strength of employing both the knowledge-based view of the ﬁrm and agency costs the-
ory to study the relationship between WoB and CPDR. However, it also has limitations. First, our ﬁndings are
contrary to the conventional wisdom that WoB tend to vote for CPDR, and we do not study the conditions
under which women prefer CSR. Second, we deﬁne CPDR as a kind of agency cost that does not beneﬁt inves-
tors, but we do not examine the relationship between CPDR and corporate performance or investor reaction
to directly test this proposition. Third, the moderating factors of the relationship between WoB and CPDR
have some limitations. Speciﬁcally, female directors’ backgrounds, such as their beliefs and personal relation-
ships with disaster areas, also inﬂuence their decisions, but we do not control for such factors. Fourth, our
data is from a single source, which might generate omitted variable bias given that an endogenous event would
inﬂuence both dependent and independent variables that we do consider. In addition, the sample selection
method may be biased because we only include listed ﬁrms, but many other types of ﬁrms, such as non-listed
and multinational ﬁrms, also contribute to disaster relief.
Future research should be pursued in three directions. First, it should explore the relationship between
WoB and CPDR in diﬀerent contexts. Comparative studies of ﬁrms responding to disasters that have hap-
pened in diﬀerent countries would be very informative. Second, women are becoming increasingly important
in corporate governance and it is essential to determine how best to empower them to maximize the beneﬁts
generated from their service on corporate boards. Third, further studies that examine other moderators of the
relationship between WoB and CPDR would be very useful.
5.4. Conclusion
Our results reveal that female directors do not always respond positively to CSR initiatives. They do
increase a ﬁrm’s rationality with regard to joining disaster relief eﬀorts and respond negatively to CPDR.
However, political connections positively moderate the relationship between WoB and CPDR.
Our primary goal in this study is to inspire further research that expands our understanding of this special
phenomenon of CPDR and to provide a more intense study of the eﬀects of gender on corporate governance
and management. Our ﬁndings strongly support the importance of the link between WoB and CPDR. We
demonstrate that there is considerable value in drawing on CSR, especially CPDR, to understand whether
and how to initiate a CPDR to increase an organization’s success.
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